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Due Process of Abortion
Luis Kuiner*
The life cycle is set into motion by the formation of an
embryo which becomes implanted in the womb of the woman.
A fetus then develops, and the signs of pregnancy appear.
Pregnancy and the giving of birth and motherhood cause elation
to most women, but to many these occurrences are, for various
reasons, a cause for despair. Thus, a woman may desire to
terminate the pregnancy before the embryo or fetus attains via-
bility.
Termination of pregnancies of less than three months' dura-
tion is a simple and safe procedure involving a D and C-cervical
dilation and curettage. The doctor dilates the neck of the womb
-the cervix-by the use of a metal dilator and then scrapes all
products of conception from the walls of the womb. After this
is completed, drugs are administered to contract the womb to
normal size and sanitary packings are used to prevent post-
operative infection. This procedure is generally recognized to be
safe and requires a minimum of hospitalization.
If the pregnancy is further advanced, a hysterectomy, similar
to a Caesarian section, may be performed. This operation is as
complex as any major abdominal surgery, but the risks are not
great.
Another technique which may be used is "salting out," in-
volving the insertion of a needle through the wall of the womb
into the amniotic sac where the fetus is suspended. The amnio-
tic fluid is then removed from the patient's womb by a syringe
and is replaced by a salt solution. Within 48 hours the patient
experiences labor, and the fetus and placenta are expelled from
the womb in a manner similar to spontaneous miscarriage.
These three procedures rarely cause complications and do
not interfere with the patient's fertility.1 However, generally
throughout the world the law prohibits the intentional termi-
nation of pregnancy-abortion-except for reasons of medical
necessity-therapeutic abortion-limited to preserving the life
of the mother. Nearly every state in the United States has a
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statute expressly outlawing abortion.2
Clearly, these statutes restrict the freedom of the woman
who desires an abortion and the doctor who may be willing to
treat her. By restricting her freedom these laws appear to in-
fringe upon her constitutional right of privacy, the doctor-patient
relationship, and-at least in the case of a married woman-the
family relationship. The contention may be made, however, that
the fetus also has certain constitutional rights which require
protection.
This article seeks to explore these constitutional issues.
The present state of statutory law will be surveyed, followed by a
consideration of the actual practice of abortion, a consideration of
recent reforms and a presentation of a proposed solution.
I. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
The procurement, or attempted procurement, of an abortion
by any means whatsoever constitutes a possible felony in nearly
every state in the Union. But each state statute contains ex-
ceptions to this prohibition.3 In most states an abortion is per-
mitted if its purpose is to preserve the life of the mother,4 while
in at least three states an abortion may be performed to preserve
the life or health of the mother.5 Another state allows abor-
tion to save the life of the mother or to prevent serious or
permanent bodily injury to her,6 and in Maryland abortions are
condoned when the physician is "satisfied that the fetus is dead,
or that no other method will secure the safety of the mother."7
The one noted judicial interpretation of the narrow excep-
tion "to preserve the life of the mother," is the famous English
case of Rex v. Bourne8 which involved the prosecution of an emi-
nent obstetrical surgeon who, openly and without compensation,
performed an operation to terminate the pregnancy of a four-
teen year old girl, victim of a forcible rape by several soldiers.
2. Guttmacher, Abortion-Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, in
THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABoRTION Now 1, 5 (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967).
3. Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and
Unyielding Law, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 123, 127 (1962); see also Kenny,
Thalidomide Catalyst To Abortion Reform, 5 Aiuz. L. REV. 105, 107
(1963).
4. See, e.g., AnT=. STAT. § 617.18 (1967).
5. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 163.060,
677.010, 677.190 (1967); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967).
6. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-3 (1963).
7. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957); Leavy and Kummer, supra
note 3.
8. [1939] 1 K.B. 687.
[Vol. 53:1
ABORTION
The doctor testified that the girl might have suffered a mental
breakdown if compelled to bear the child. Judge MacNaugh-
ten instructed the jury that a woman need not be in the jaws
of death before her pregnancy could be lawfully terminated, and
that in any case, a woman's longevity would most likely be
shortened by serious impairment of her health, though noting
that this defense would not be available to the "professional
abortionist." The surgeon was acquitted so the decision was
never appealed.
While apparently no appellate court has been squarely faced
with the issue, a few American decisions suggest this should be
the rule.9 A California appellate court did appear to follow the
Bourne interpretation by holding that not all abortions are ille-
gal.10 The court held that a showing that the abortion was not
necessary to preserve the mother's life, and that the abortee
appeared healthy before undergoing the operation does not
meet the prosecution's burden of prima facie proof. It held that
there is a presumption of necessity in the case of an abortion by a
licensed physician which cannot be overturned by a mere showing
of prior good health. The court held that the peril to life need
not be imminent, but should be great enough that the dangerous
condition be potentially present even though its full develop-
ment might be delayed, nor is it essential that the doctor believe
that the death of the patient would otherwise be certain."
Where the person performing the abortion is not a licensed
physician, and where the facts suggest that the person is a
"professional abortionist," no such presumption of necessity ex-
ists, however. In State v. Orsini,12 the court held that it was not
necessary for the state to negate all possibility of the abortion
being necessary to preserve the life of the mother in order to
make out a prima facie case. It stated that the state could make
out a prima facie case ". . . through a presumption based on
common experience that 'the ability to bear and bring forth
children is the rule, and.., the necessity of procuring an abor-
tion or miscarriage in order to save the life of mother or child
is the rare exception.' "'13
In addition to criminal prosecution and potential revocation
9. People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (1959);
Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 53 N.E.2d 4 (1944); State v.
Powers, 155 Wash. 63, 283 P. 439 (1929).
10. People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (1959).
11. Id.
12. 232 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1967).
13. Id. at 911. See State v. Lee, 69 Conn. 199, 37 A. 79, 80 (1897).
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of a physician's license' 4 for performance of an illegal abortion,
there also may be a civil sanction. A California trial court held
that a husband may sue a physician who performs an illegal
abortion upon his wife, even though she has consented, on the
grounds it constitutes a direct invasion of his personal rights in
the prospective relationship with his unborn child."; These
paternal rights were also asserted by a police officer seeking to
block an abortion of his estranged wife. Contending he was
threatened with deprivation of the care, comfort, society and
companionship of his unborn child, he argued that California's
therapeutic abortion law was unconstitutional because it
breached the right to have children, and that it had not been
shown that bearing the child would endanger his wife's health
-the basis upon which her doctors approved the abortion.'0
The particular wording of abortion statutes takes on added
significance in light of the increased use of fertility control
measures, and the precise effect of these measures. Diethylstill-
bestrol or the "morning after" pill, does not prevent ovulation or
the union of sperm and egg, but prevents implantation of the
fertilized ovum on the wall of the uterus, normally occuring
about six to seven days after conception.1 7 In Sweden a drug
known as F6103 which is to be taken once a month is in the
process of development. This drug appears to work by inter-
fering with the production or release of progesterone, a hormone
for the implantation and growth of a fertilized ovum in the
uterus. A woman may take it on the 28th day of the menstrual
cycle and menstruation will occur whether or not an egg has
been fertilized. Already on the market and approved by the
Federal Food and Drug Administration for other purposes are
estrogens-compounds composed of female hormones-which can
prevent conception up to four days after intercourse and are
routinely given in at least one New York hospital to victims of
rape. If a high dose of estrogen is given within four days after
intercourse, the ova will be prematurely flushed out of the
uterus within 48 hours. Intrauterine devices, such as plastic coils
which are inserted into the uterus by a physician, are also now
in common use. These devices do not prevent passage of the
sperm into the uterus and along the Fallopian tubes to meet the
egg, but apparently control fertility by preventing implantation
14. E.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 677.190 (1967).
15. Touriel v. Benviniste, Civil No. 76-6790 (Super. Ct., Oct. 20,
1961), noted in 14 STAN. L. REv. 901 (1962).
16. Chicago Daily News, Dec. 7, 1967, at 20 col.
17. Tnvi, May 6, 1966, at 60, col. 1.
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of the fertilized ovum, though what actually occurs is not defi-
nitely established.18
Some abortion statutes expressly make pregnancy an ele-
ment of the offense,19 while others do not.20  Statutes of the
latter category refer to acts toward "a woman," "any woman,"
or "a woman pregnant or supposed to be pregnant." Specified
acts intended to produce an abortion or miscarriage gener-
ally constitute the prohibited conduct. The problem with these
statutes is the definition of an abortion or miscarriage. Statutes
which expressly make pregnancy an element of the offense gen-
erally refer to acts toward a "pregnant" woman, a woman "preg-
nant with child" or a woman "with child." These statutes pre-
sent the problem of determining the earliest stage of pregnancy
at which the offense can be committed, i.e., whether they apply
to pregnancy before implantation. There is an absence of re-
ported cases.
21
Generally at common law a criminal abortion could not be
committed upon a woman unless she was pregnant and had
reached the stage of "quickening,"22-that stage when the mother
first feels the movement of the child, occurring in about the
fourth or fifth month of pregnancy. 23 The basis of the view
was that at this stage the unborn child had a separate existence
and was a human being, so that the termination of pregnancy
after "quickening" constituted the destruction of a human
being.24 Since the preimplantation means of fertility control
act before "quickening," their use would not generally be a
criminal abortion under the common law, at least within those
jurisdictions where "quickening" was required. Today in all
jurisdictions the crime of abortion is controlled by statute and
the trend is to omit the requirement of "quickening."
Under abortion statutes which refer to acts toward a "preg-
nant woman," courts have generally held that the woman need
not reach any particular stage of pregnancy, and these statutes
have been construed to mean that pregnancy begins at the mo-
ment of conception and terminates with the delivery of the
18. Note, 46 ORE. L. REv. 211 (1967).
19. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-404 (1964).
20. See, e.g., MnN. STAT. § 617.18 (1967); N.Y. REv. LAW § 125.05
(McKinney 1967).
21. See Meloy, Pre-Implantation Fertility Control and the Abor-
tion Laws, 41 CH.-KENT L. RELV. 183 (1964).
22. Meloy, supra note 21; Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1396 (1956).
23. BLAKISTON'S NEW GOULD MEDICAL DicToxxAay 999 (2d ed. 1956).
24. Meloy, supra note 21.
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child.25 Under these statutes the intrauterine devices and other
preimplantation fertility control measures could possibly be
barred.26
Where the abortion statutes refer to a woman "pregnant
with child," court decisions conflict as to whether a particular
stage of pregnancy must be established. Some judicial decisions
require that the prosecution show the mother was quick with
child, while other courts hold the woman pregnant from concep-
tion. 27 But all the cases are consistent in that pregnancy has
to be proved before an illegal abortion may occur. Since preg-
nancy cannot be proved until after implantation takes place, it
would be impossible to prove that any user of a fertility con-
trol drug or device had intentionally destroyed the product of
conception.
Statutes which do not require pregnancy as an element of
the offense do require a showing that the accused believed that
the woman upon whom the act was committed was pregnant
at the time.28 The taking of a "morning after" pill in the belief
that pregnancy has occurred might be prohibited under these
statutes. The doctor prescribing the pill could be held to be in
violation of such a statute. A similar construction would apply
to statutes referring to acts toward a woman pregnant or sup-
posed by the accused to be pregnant.29
IL THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW
Practically every physician has at some time in his career
been called upon to perform an abortion.3 0 Professional ethics
and the law inhibit him. In many metropolitan areas the doctor
refers the case to a hospital committee and thereby avoids the
conflicting pressures placed upon him by his relationship to his
patient, professional duties and legal obligations. The decison is
made by the committee usually composed of gynecologists, ex-
25. Id.; Note, 46 ORE. L. REV. 211 (1967).
26. Some jurisdictions have abortion-related statutes which pro-
hibit the manufacture, sale or distribution of abortificants. Under these
statutes the manufacturer, distributor or druggist might be prosecuted.
See, e.g., APXZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-211 (1956).
27. Id. Identical wording in a state statute was construed differ-
ently in Foster v. State, 182 Wis. 298, 196 N.W. 233 (1923), as limited to
quickening and State v. Ausplund, 86 Ore. 121, 167 P. 1019 (1917), where
applied at conception. In the latter case the mother had died.
28. People v. Murphy, 60 Cal. App. 2d 762, 141 P.2d 755 (1943);
Note, 46 ORE. L. REv. 211, 217 (1967).
29. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957).
30. E. ScHuR, CRnIES WITHOUT VIcTiMS 25 (1965).
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perts in internal medicine and psychiatrists. A survey of com-
mittee decisions by hospitals in California revealed that of 24
hospitals, 18 believed that they had authorized the performance
of therapeutic abortions which did not strictly conform to the
legal norm.31 There was a considerable diversity of opinion as to
standards for authorizing performance of an abortion. Regard-
ing the hypothetical case of a 15 year old minister's daughter,
pregnant as a result of forcible rape, 15 of 22 hospitals indicated
approval of therapeutic abortion despite the fact that the law
of California was clearly to the contrary.
2
Despite the broad interpretation of statutes by hospital
boards, hospitals are severely constrained by statutory require-
ments so that they now perform very few abortions. In re-
cent years there has been a pronounced decline in the rate of
therapeutic abortions. For example, in New York the rate de-
clined 43 per cent from 1943 to 1953 (from 5.1 per thousand to
2.9 in 1953). 33 This decline resulted from medical advances in
the treatment of conditions that once constituted major threats to
pregnancy so that women with heart disease, hypertensive renal
disease, tuberculosis and other serious conditions are increasingly
allowed to fulfill the terms of the pregnancy. Abortion is
seldom necessary to save the physical well-being of the woman.
The focus today is upon psychiatric considerations. In
recent years the number of abortions performed on psychiatric
grounds has increased. But a hospital that wishes to abide by
the letter of the law in a state prohibiting the termination of a
pregnancy except when necessary to save the mother's life may
grant an abortion on psychiatric grounds only where the woman
presents a very convincing threat of suicide. There obviously is
no reliable means for determining if a woman would actually
carry out her threat, since a woman seeking an abortion may
claim life is no longer worth living even if she has no intentions
or tendencies to commit suicide. However, because pregnancy
causes physiological and psychological reorientation, the possi-
bility of serious depression is always present and may be in-
creased by socio-economic difficulties. Frequently, such depres-
sion may prompt a woman to seek an abortion regardless of
the decision of the hospital. Though most hospitals will not
take such determination into account when considering an ap-
31. Packer & Gampbell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law
and Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REV. 417, 430 (1959).
32. Id. at 435.
33. ABORTION IN Tm UNITED STATES 83 (M. Calderone ed. 1958).
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plication for abortion, such determination may be regarded as a
relevant factor by the psychiatrist.
The psychiatrist, in recommending abortions, may face skep-
ticism by other medical personnel involved in ruling on the
case.84 Doctors differ as to whether socio-economic factors
should be considered. In the Scandinavian countries there has
been a willingness to grant legal abortions for certain well-
defined and serious psychosomatic disorders.35 This type of
diagnosis would not justify abortion under American law,
though such conditions are considered to be relevant by some
practitioners.
Medical progress has unearthed eugenic indications of pros-
pects that the fetus is deformed. Since 1941, it has become
widely known that at least 30 per cent of children whose mothers
have Rubella (German measles) before the twelfth week of preg-
nancy are born with congenital abnormalities.3 6 Hospitals will
perform abortions on such grounds despite the law to the
contrary 7
The case of Sheri Finkbine, which involved the question of
aborting a fetus apparently deformed by thalidomide tablets,
focused upon this aspect of the abortion problem and served to
dramatize the abortion controversy in general. A panel of doc-
tors at a Phoenix hospital agreed that an abortion should be
performed but the decision was overruled by the hospital ad-
ministrator who demanded clarification of the operation's legal
status. Mrs. Finkbine then sought a declaratory judgment from
a superior court judge which was dismissed for jurisdictional
reasons. She then obtained an abortion in Sweden where the
laws are less restrictive.38 However, in many hospitals in the
United States a therapeutic abortion would be granted in a case
such as Mrs. Finkbine's despite the law to the contrary.
It is probable that the majority of therapeutic abortions in
the United States are illegal.39 Whether an abortion will be
granted in a particular case depends upon the particular hos-
pital. The state will often refrain from prosecuting.
Not all unwillingly pregnant women have an equal oppor-
tunity to receive hospital-approved abortions. The poor person
34. E. Sc=m, supra note 30, at 16.
35. ABORTION IN THE UNIED STATES, supra note 33, at 137.
36. E. Sc~m~, supra note 30, at 15.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 11.
39. Packer & Gampbell, supra note 31.
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or the individual with more modest financial means is less likely
to obtain one. In New York City the ratio of such operations to
live births in private hospitals is almost double that of the vol-
untary or public hospital.40 The city hospitals have the lowest
ratio. Almost invariably the private patient receives greater
consideration than the clinic patient.41 Negro and Puerto Ri-
can women are less likely to be granted a therapeutic abortion
than those from other ethnic groups.42 The unmarried woman
stands much less chance of getting a therapeutic abortion than
the married. Another inequitable practice is that in many
cases the woman obtaining a therapeutic abortion must agree
to undergo sterilization.43
The woman unable to obtain a therapeutic abortion at a
hospital may seek a doctor who will be willing to perform an
abortion despite the law. Some physicians are available to per-
form an abortion, despite its illegality, because of a sympathetic
regard for the plight of the patient. But in most cities pro-
fessional abortionists are to be found operating a lucrative illicit
business. For $200 to $500 or more, a woman may obtain an
abortion. The annual "take" from illegal abortions has been esti-
mated at over $350,000,000 and they are considered to be the third
largest illegal endeavor in the United States, surpassed only by
gambling and narcotics. 44
An illegal abortion may be a traumatic experience since the
woman is at the mercy of the abortionist. In many instances,
the abortionist is competent and capable of performing an abor-
tion safely. But there are countless instances of abortions per-
formed by untrained individuals under crude conditions which
have caused hemorrhages and aseptic poisoning resulting in
40. ABonRoN n THE UNIED STATES, supra note 33, at 77-78. "The
private patients of the voluntary hospitals have over three times as
many abortions as the service patients in the same type of institution and
more than twenty times as many abortions as patients in municipal
hospitals." Guttmacher, supra note 2, at 9.
41. E. Scnrn, supra note 30, at 21. Generally the law enforce-
ment agencies allow the hospitals to police themselves. An individual
doctor, in sole charge of the private patient develops a sense of per-
sonal responsibility toward her, while the same degree of responsibility
is rarely developed toward clinic patients, so that doctors are less prone
to breach the statute. The municipal hospital, too often staffed by the
same physician as the voluntary, is more timid, perhaps because of
political considerations. Guttmacher, supra note 2, at 11-12.
42. Pilpel, The Abortion Crisis, in THn CASE FOR LEGALiZED ABORTION
Now 97, 100 (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967).
43. E. Scamu, supra note 30, at 22.
44. D. Lowe, supra note 1, at 77.
19681
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
sterility and death.45 Illegal abortions may take the lives of
more than 5,000 women each year.46 However, the use of
antibiotics and the exercise of increased care have decreased
the likelihood of death. Known abortion deaths in New York
City have declined from 144 in 1921 to 15 in 1951, but a dis-
proportionate number of the women who died were Negroes,
and though more of the women who underwent abortions were
married, more deaths occurred among those who were single.47
A major problem stems from the fact that the laws against
abortion are largely unenforceable. The number of illegal
abortions performed annually in the United States has been esti-
mated to vary from 300,000 to over one million.48 For every
legal abortion performed in the United States, 110 are said
to be performed illegally.49 The odds against being arrested
for performing an illegal abortion have been estimated to be
45. The recent case of State v. Orsini, 232 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1967)
provides a vivid example of the dangerous and frightening methods
employed by the professional abortionist. Upon discovering that she was
pregnant, complainant arranged with a Dr. Walker for an abortion.
"Walker" was an alias, and the defendant was not a medical man. A few
days later the woman received a telephone call and was instructed to go
to a motel in an outlying town that evening. She met with the defend-
ants, but because she had eaten a few hours earlier and might have
become ill, the abortion was postponed.
The following morning complainant was taken to another room
where she paid the defendants $390.00. She was then placed on some
towels on the bed and "Dr. Walker" inserted a shoehorn device to
effect the abortion. The other defendant gave her "some white pills
for bleeding and some green pills for pain." The woman was told that
if this attempt was not successful she should take citrate of magnesia,
and, if that did not work, mineral oil. The abortion procedure was to
be repeated the following week if these methods failed.
After resting in her room for a time, Complainant arose and drove
home. Continued excessive vaginal bleeding led to hospitalization and
surgical treatment.
46. E. ScHuR, supra note 30, at 28.
47. ABORTIO iN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 33, at 67-69.
48. Sulloway, The Legal and Political Aspects of Population
Control in the United States, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 593, 597 (1960).
The practice of abortion has given rise to a shadow culture of deviance
having its own values, norms and patterns of behavior. It even oper-
ates by the law of supply and demand with an abortion to fit every
pocketbook. Newman, Between the Ideal and the Reality: Values in
American Society, in THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION Now 61, 65
(A. Guttmacher ed. 1967). See also E. ScHUR, supra note 30, at 31-34.
All figures as to incidences of abortion are educated guesses, since reli-
able statistics are lacking. Estimates are derived from population
sampling. Those advocating abortion reform cite the higher figures,
while those opposed refer to the lower figures. Hellegers, Law and the
Common Good, 86 COMMONWEAL 418 (1967).
49. D. Lowe, supra note 1.
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about 200 to one, assuming there are over a million illegal
abortions annually. Only 500 cases reach trial each year.50
Alabama had only forty prosecutions resulting in only five
convictions between 1892 and 1935. In Michigan over a 42-
year period there were only forty convictions.51 Occasionally,
law enforcement officers in a particular area may engage in
a concerted effort to round up abortionists, but even such ef-
forts merely scratch the surface of the illegal abortion prob-
lem. Women unwillingly pregnant are usually determined to
obtain abortions despite the law. Therefore, the goals of law
enforcement officials are, in practice, limited to the control of
abortion rather than to its elimination.52
The obtaining of evidence to convict an abortionist involves
almost insurmountable difficulties. Rarely will the woman who
has undergone an abortion willingly file a complaint and she is
usually reluctant to testify despite the immunity which may be
granted her in some jurisdictions.53 Ordinarily a hospital will
report the case of a patient admitted for treatment who ap-
pears to have undergone an abortion. In New York this is re-
quired by ordinance. But doctors may disagree as to whether
a woman has in fact undergone an abortion. Clearly, not much
information is likely to be obtained by this procedure.5 4 The
prosecutor will be informed about an abortion through the
death of a woman or through clear evidence of the criminal
abortion of a woman who has subsequently been hospitalized.
Female investigators may then be sent to the physician's office
to see if he will perform an abortion. But mere preparation to
perform the operation may be insufficient for criminal liability.55
Although the most fruitful device is a well-prepared and timed
raid at the time when the abortion is in fact being performed or
just after it has been completed, it is difficult to justify ignoring
the risks to the woman to obtain a conviction.
Even after the evidence has been obtained, the prosecution
still has to prove that the abortion was not medically necessary,
and in the case of a physician, there is a presumption of good
faith.5 1 Juries are loathe to convict physicians, and judges re-
50. Id.
51. Note, 29 J. CRIn. L. 595, 596 (1937); Note, 35 CoLUm. L. REv.
87 (1935).
52. E. Scrai, supra note 30.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 251 P.2d 29 (1953).
56. Id.; Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship
and Unyielding Law, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 123, 127 (1962).
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frain from imposing harsh sentences.
Thus, the woman wanting an abortion who cannot obtain a
therapeutic abortion at a hospital is able to have an illegal abor-
tion in this country if she is willing to pay the price. The abor-
tionist can efficiently arrange his affairs to avoid detection by
law enforcement authorities and possible conviction.
Abortions, though illegal, are easily obtained in neighboring
countries such as Puerto Rico and Mexico, to which many unwill-
ingly pregnant women travel.57 Though Mexican law pro-
hibits abortions, large scale illegal abortion rings operate in
Tijuana. Generally, Mexican and California law enforcement
authorities attempt to control (but not eliminate) the situation
by cracking down upon the incompetent abortionists. Border
police will stop girls under 18 years of age. However, the weal-
thier woman will travel to Tokyo where she may legally obtain
an abortion in a hospital and receive excellent medical care.58
In contrast, the woman unable to find or pay for an abortionist
may attempt a self-induced abortion by resorting to such crude
methods as bougies, hairpins, or coat hangers which may en-
danger her health.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ABORTION LAWS
If a woman is prevented by law from having an abortion
when she so desires, or if her doctor is prevented from prescrib-
ing or performing an abortion her liberty is being infringed
upon and state authority has interfered with the doctor-patient
relationship. When the state imposes such restrictions, constitu-
tional issues arise.
A. Rights of the Mother
Though the Supreme Court has abandoned notions of "sub-
stantive due process" in deferring to the legislature's author-
ity to engage in social and economic experiments, 9 the Court
has manifested particular concern with regard to legislative
interference regarding family relationship and the right to bear
57. D. LowE, AEORTioN AND THE LAW 41-43 (1966).
58. Id.
59. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 728 (1963); Daniel v. Family
Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. North-
western Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Gossert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948); Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond
Assn., 313 U.S. 236 (1941); United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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and rear children.6° In Griswold v. Connecticut,61 the Court
asserted a constitutionally protected "right of privacy" which
is derived from the enumerated rights of the first eight amend-
ments, and from the "other" rights retained by the people through
the ninth amendment as applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. This right has been held to encompass the
marital relationship by protecting against state interference
with the use of contraceptives.6 2
The Griswold case, however, involved the use of contracep-
tives as affecting married couples, and the Court found the Con-
necticut birth control statute unconstitutional. But the consti-
tutional protections could also be deemed to encompass a physi-
cian who prescribes contraceptives. The case arose out of the
prosecution of a birth control clinic which had prescribed contra-
ceptives. Applying the same rationale, a physician prescribing
and performing an abortion could also assert the constitutional
right of privacy. The law, in prohibiting his action, interferes
with the rights of his patient. Moreover, a woman may claim
that the law, in preventing the doctor from performing an abor-
tion, interferes with her rights. Clearly, the laws forbidding
abortion interfere with her right to determine whether or not to
bear children. As applied to married women, the laws in-
fringe upon the marital relationship.
The Court traditionally upholds such laws only if it can be
established that an overriding legitimate legislative purpose ex-
ists to justify interfering with individual and family privacy.
To prevent abortion as a means for discouraging fornication and
other illicit sexual conduct would probably not be regarded as a
proper overriding legislative purpose to justify such interfer-
ence, especially since the abortion laws apply to married women.63
The abortion laws cannot be justified as needed to protect the
health of women, since safe and simple methods for perform-
ing an abortion have been developed.6 4
60. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
61. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
62. Id.
63. The concurring opinions of Justices Goldberg and White in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) held that the state could
not properly discourage fornication by interfering with the marital re-
lationship through prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married
couples.
64. In Hungary where abortion is completely legal a study of a
quarter million cases indicated a death rate of less than 6 per 100,000
to be contrasted with 17 per 100,000 in the United States for the re-
1968]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1
Another purpose of the abortion laws may be to maintain
population levels. Nations which permit abortion-such as Ja-
pan, Poland and Hungary-have had a decline in the birth
rate.8 5 However, contemporary concern has generally been
focused upon overpopulation rather than decline in population.
Thus, it is unlikely that courts would regard maintenance of
the population level as an overriding legislative purpose.
The prohibition of abortion as a means for upholding public
morality or because abortion itself is immoral would not be a
proper legislative purpose. The notion of the state seeking to
regulate private activity which does not threaten public health,
safety or order may be regarded as an invasion of privacy and an
arbitrary restraint upon individual liberty.0 0 The state should
not be permitted to inflict punishment where there is no in-
fringement upon the rights of others.67 Also, justification of
abortion laws on moral grounds alone may result in a finding of
an infringement on the religious establishment clause of the
first amendment, in that the abortion statutes establish a reli-
gion by enforcing a religious morality.""
The argument might also be made that the abortion statutes
deprive poor persons of the equal protection of the laws, be-
cause in practice the woman of means is able to obtain an abor-
tion by having a reputable physician label it "therapeutic."0 0
The fact that patients receiving medical attention through a
clinic, or in a public supported hospital, are less likely to re-
ceive permission for an abortion may indicate a denial of equal
protection.
It has also been suggested that abortion statutes are subject
to attack on the ground that they are vaguely worded. Such
vagueness makes application of the statute difficult and results
in differing interpretations by hospital boards. 0
moval of tonsils and adenoids or 24 per 100,000 for childbirth among the
white population. Childbirth is four times as dangerous as competently
performed abortion. Psychological effects will depend on social atti-
tudes. Hardin, Abortion and Human Dignity, in THE CASE FOR LEGAL-
IZE ABoRTioN Now 69, 72 (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967).
65. Rossi, Abortion Laws and Their Victims, TRANs-ACTIoN, Sept./
Oct., 1966, at 7, 10.
66. Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut: The Justices and Connecticut's
"Uncommonly Silly Law," 42 NoTRE DA~m LAW. 680, 702 (1967).
67. H. HART, LAW, LiBEaTY AND MORAUTY (1963); Hughes, Morals
and the Criminal Law, 71 YALE L.J. 662 (1962).
68. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity,
63 COLUm. L. REV. 391 (1963); Katin, supra note 66, at 696-97.
69. Pilpel, supra note 42, at 100.
70. Id.
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B. Rights of the Fetus
Perhaps the one basis upon which the Court may find the
abortion laws constitutional would be that these statutes seek to
protect the life of the fetus. If the Court regarded the fetus as
a person, the state would be justified in protecting its right to
birth and life.
In religion and medicine life may begin at conception; in
most legal systems personality begins only at birth. As one
writer observes, at about the sixth day of pregnancy, the fetal
organism "is probably entitled by force of nature to claim a
potential 'natural personality'; but it is only a fact in nature
and is independent of the law, since 'legal personality' is the
grant of the law."'71 This natural personality is not concerned
with legal capacities or prohibitions. 72
However, rights of the fetus were sometimes recognized at
common law. Blackstone explained:
An infant in [sic] ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is
supposed in law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of
having a legacy, or a surrender of a copyhold estate made to it.
It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is enabled to
have an estate limited to its use, and to take afterwards by such
limitation, as if it were then actually born. And in this point
the Civil law agrees with ours.73
Thus, to protect interests at birth, courts have granted the fetus
certain contractual benefits and property rights, provided it is
subsequently born alive.74  Moreover, the common law recog-
nized that the fetus had a claim to life by requiring the execu-
tion of a pregnant woman be stayed until after its birth.75
Clearly, the Supreme Court could find medical and legal
support for regarding the fetus, at least when capable of de-
veloping to a human being, as a person entitled to constitu-
tional protection. But if the fetus is regarded as a person en-
titled to such protection, it would be a denial of equal protection
of the laws to deny this protection to some fetuses because they
may be born defective or for other reasons.76 An abortion, par-
71. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 579, 587 (1965).
72. R. GRAVEsoN, STATUS iN THE ComnvzoN LAW 111 (1953), quoted
in Gordon, supra note 71, at 587 n.46.
73. 1 BLACKSTONE, ComENTARES COmm. I, 129-30 (4th ed. 1771),
quoted in Gordon, supra note 71.
74. Gordon, supra note 71, at 586-87.
75. Id. at 582; 2 W. HAWKvNS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2.51.9 (J.
Curwood ed. 1824); 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 412 (Dogherty ed.
1800).
76. Comment, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 283 (1965).
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ticularly if performed in a government supported hospital, could
be construed as a taking of life without the due process of law
and, therefore, make the hospital and physician liable under the
Civil Rights Act.7 7
However, it is possible for a legislature to protect the fetus
without the necessity that it be regarded as a person entitled to
full constitutional protection. Inasmuch as legal precedent has
conferred limited legal rights upon the fetus, the Supreme Court
could find that the legislature may act to protect such rights and
that this would constitute a legitimate legislative purpose.
It thus becomes clear that the legal question of what con-
stitutes human life is an important one. This is a question which
arises both at the beginning and at the end of life. Should life
be said to begin at conception? At the point where the fetus
possesses the potentiality of becoming a human being? When it
may exist outside the womb? Or at birth? Reliance on scien-
tific criteria alone will not resolve these questions.7 8
Science can only contribute in a secondary way to the solu-
tion of the question of the origin of the human individual. The
criteria defining what constitutes a human person must come
from the disciplines of philosophy and theology. The Roman
Catholic Bishops of California issued a statement in 1966 which
attempted to base their position regarding the status of the fetus
upon biology, but scientists are unable to tell whether an em-
bryo at a certain stage is a human person. Whether an arbitrary
point should be set is a moral question.79
At any rate, legal protection cannot rationally extend before
the point where the organism may potentially develop fully to
human life. Obviously, an abortion statute constitutionally
grounded upon the rights of the fetus may not be extended to
outlaw preimplantation fertility control.6 0 Intrauterine devices
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
78. That abortion is a moral rather than a medical problem is
pointed out by Szasz, THE ETmcs or AnORTION, HUMAmsT, TRANS-ACTION,
Sept./Oct., 1966, at 147. For some the destruction of the fetus constitutes
fetal euthanasia. D. BONHOEFFER, ETHIcs 130 (1955); Hanley, Rights of
the Unborn Child, 25 TRANS. PAc. OST. GYN. Soc. 1 (1957); Ramsey, The
Sanctity of Life, THE DUBLIN REv. (Spring, 1967). Others have con-
sidered abortion as the "loss of conception before viability," defined
as 20 weeks gestation or 400 grams. ILLINoIs CIr7ZENS FOR THE MEDICAL
CONTROL OF ABORTION, FACT SHEET ON LEGAL STATUS OF ABORTION. Still
others regard the fetus as similar to a limb of the woman's body.
Leavy and Kummer, supra note 56, at 133-37.
79. Hayes, Abortion: A Biological View, 85 ColmoNwEAL 676
(1967).
80. See note 62 supra, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53:1
ABORTION
and "morning after" pills actually are forms of contraceptive
drugs and devices. Also, any policy consideration regarding the
rights of the fetus as balanced against the rights of the woman
bearing it, and those of society generally, should be made initi-
ally by the legislature unhampered by judicial restrictions as to
constitutionality.
IV. RECENT REFORM MEASURES
The widespread violation of the abortion laws, even by
hospitals in granting therapeutic abortions, has stimulated agi-
tation for legislative reform. Abortion has become a private as
well as a public health problem. Since 1965, the American Medi-
cal Association and some state medical groups have adopted reso-
lutions urging reform, and bills for amending abortion laws
were introduced in 26 states during 1967.81 Generally, attempts
for reform have been thwarted because of pressure from reli-
gious groups, particularly from Catholic clergy.82  However,
some Protestant and Jewish clergy have manifested greater
sympathy, as in New York where a group of clergymen have
provided consultation services for women seeking an abortion.83
81. MEDicAL WORLD NEws, Sept. 29, 1967, at 47.
82. The Catholic position has been that any direct attack on the
fetus is murder. Both mother and child are patients of the Catholic
physician and each has an equal right to live; he must attempt to save
them both, and cannot choose between saving one or the other. How-
ever, the mother is not morally required to forego medicine or treatment
which will save her life if, by so doing, the death of her unborn child
is permitted. An indirect abortion is permitted as where a cancerous
womb must be removed or, in ectopic pregnancy, where a portion of
the Fallopian tube is cut because an ovum has embedded itself in the
wall of the tube. The Canon Law punishes all who effectively procure
abortion and all abortionists.
Early Christianity, influenced by Aristotle, distinguished between
early and later pregnancy. To Augustine, aborting the unformed fetus
was punishable only by a fine, while aborting the formed fetus was
punishable by the penalty for murder, the difference being a period
fixed at forty days. This distinction appeared in the Gratian Code
which influenced the common law position. Innocent III gave it recog-
nition by canoncial legislation in 1211. However, Pius IX abandoned the
distinction in 1869 and the prohibition applied to the embryo at concep-
tion. N. ST. Jomn-STEvAs, RiGHT TO LIFE 31, 32 (1964).
St. Thomas Aquinas had taken the position that no human life
exists until the seventh week of pregnancy and some Catholic theolo-
gians still adhere to this position. McCormick, Abortions, 112 AMERIcA
877 (1965).
CommoNwEAL, the liberal Catholic periodical, while opposing abor-
tion reform, announced it will assume an open mind. 85 ComnoNwE"am
667 (1967).
83. New York Times, May 22, 1967, at 1, col. 2.
On February 27, 1968, a coalition of 48 organizations in New York
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Abortion law reforms have been enacted in Colorado, North
Carolina and California.
The American Law Institute has proposed reform as part of
its Model Penal Code.8 4 The Code adopts Roscoe Pound's socio-
logical jurisprudence approach in attempting to resolve the con-
flicting interests. The proposal is somewhat similar to the stat-
utes presently in force in Denmark and Sweden which allow an
abortion when the pregnant woman's physical or mental health is
gravely impaired, the child is likely to be born with grave phy-
sical or mental defects, the mother is underaged, or when the
pregnancy is the result of rape or incest.85 Unlike the Scandi-
navian statutes, however, the Code does not provide for abortion
where there is "anticipated weakness" or what the comments
seem to refer to as "individual hardship." The Code also omits
the Scandinavian provision for an independent board or com-
mittee to determine whether an abortion should be performed,
providing instead for an abortion when two physicians [one of
whom may be the person performing the abortion] have certified
in writing the circumstances which they believe justified. 6 The
Code avoids the problem of preimplantation fertility control by
stating that the prohibition against abortion shall not be deemed
applicable "to the prescription, administration or distribution of
drugs or other substances for avoiding pregnancy, whether by
preventing implantation of a fertilized ovum or by any other
announced their intention to lobby for abortion law reform. The Or-
ganizations for abortion law reform include civic, political, medical,
religious and social-welfare groups.
Forty-two New York legislators have sponsored a bill to permit
abortion when there is substantial risk that pregnancy would gravely
impair the physical or mental health of the mother, where there is sub-
stantial risk that the child would be born with gross physical or mental
defects, or when the pregnancy results from rape or incest. The present
law permits abortion only to save the life of the mother. However, the
proposal to amend the New York law on abortion was sent back to the
committee and effectively killed despite the fact that supporters claimed
they had sufficient votes for passage in the Assembly. Pressures from
Catholic groups contributed to the defeat of the bill in an election year.
New York Times, Apr. 4, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
After five years of study, a special legislative commission recom-
mended a sweeping revision of Connecticut's criminal laws, including
new grounds for abortion. Abortions which are now permitted in Con-
necticut only to save a pregnant woman's life would be made legal also
in cases of rape or incest, and for any unmarried girl under the age of 17
regardless of the circumstances of her pregnancy. New York Times,
June 4, 1968, at 22, col. 1.
84. MODEL PENAL CODE.L § 207.11 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
85. Barnard, An Analysis and Criticism of the Model Penal Code
Provisions on the Law of Abortion, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 540, 547 (1967).
86. Id. at 547.
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method that operates before, at, or immediately after fertiliza-
tion," though some problem might arise as to whether this pro-
vision would also apply to mechanical devices. 87
Though the Code has been generally ill-received by state
legislatures8 8-having been, in substance, enacted in only three
states-it has been more favorably received by commentators be-
cause of its more liberalized approach.8 9 However, it has been
criticized for its failure to consider the moral aspects of the prob-
lem,90 and for neglecting the rights of the unborn child.9 1 Also,
one writer has criticized the Code's characterization of the
fetus as an inchoate being, arguing that it is indisputably com-
plete and integrated in its essential elements, requiring nothing
but food to grow.92
Groups such as the Illinois Citizens for the Medical Control
of Abortion as well as some noted lawyers who advocate reform
of the abortion laws to permit abortion upon request, have been
critical of the Code proposals for being too limited.9 3 Though it
provides some relief, it does not solve the abortion problem be-
cause most of the abortions performed outside of hospitals today
do not, in fact, fall into the categories proposed by the Code. It
is also contended that, if present laws were constitutionally and
reasonably interpreted, they would probably permit most of the
abortions permitted by the Model Penal Code.94
The New York City and Southern California Civil Liberties
87. Meloy, Pre-Implantation Fertility Control and the Abortion
Laws, 41 Cm.-KENT. L. REV. 183 (1964).
88. Id.
89. Barnard, supra note 85, at 540.
90. Tinnelly, Abortion and Penal Law, 5 CATH. LAW 187 (1959).
91. Comment, 37 U. CoLo. L. REv. 283 (1965).
92. lAietus & Mietus, Criminal Abortion: "A Failure of Law" or
a Challenge to Society?, 51 A.B.A.J. 924, 925 (1965).
93. Pilpel, see note 42 supra, believes the abortion statutes may be
modified through judicial interpretation rather than by legislative
amendment.
94. Drinan, The Right of the Fetus to Be Born (Paper prepared
for the International Conference on Abortions, Sept. 6-8, 1967, Washing-
ton, D.C.). Drinan criticizes the Code for singling out certain types of
individuals whose lives, for the first time in American jurisprudence,
can be taken not because of any offense they may have committed but
only because their existence is inconvenient to others. He urges:
Abortion on request-or an absence of law with respect to abor-
tion-has at least the merit of not involving the law and society
in the business of selecting those persons whose lives may be
legally terminated. A system of permitting abortion on request
has the undeniable virtue of neutralizing the law so that, while
the law does not forbid abortion, it does not on the other hand




Unions have urged that a statute dealing with abortion should
merely provide that abortions must be performed by physicians,
thereby making the decision as to whether to perform an abor-
tion a medical problem. Other groups have suggested that abor-
tions must be performed in hospitals and that at least two doc-
tors should concur in performing the abortion. Still others
urge that the abortion statutes should simply be repealed and
the same legal rules applied as are applicable to medical prac-
tice generally.
American public opinion apparently does not support far
reaching reformation of the abortion statutes. A survey in
1965 by the National Opinion Research Council indicated that the
majority would favor abortion only for those reasons adopted
by the Code provisions.9 5 The questions asked and answers
given were as follows:
Please tell me whether or not you think it should




If the woman's own health is
seriously endangered by
the pregnancy? 71% 26% 3%
If she became pregnant as a
result of rape? 56% 38% 6%
If there is a strong chance of
serious defect in the baby? 55% 41% 4%
If the family has a very low
income and cannot afford
any more children? 21% 77% 2%
If she is not married and does not
want to marry the man? 18% 80% 2%
If she is married and does not
want any more children? 15% 83% 2%
There was very little difference in response between Catholics
and Protestants or Jews, though frequent church attendance
among both Protestants and Catholics indicated a more restrict-
ive attitude toward abortion. Attitudes toward abortion cut
across both political orientation and party lines. Clearly, there
is majority support for abortion as a safeguard of mental health
or a prevention of the anguish associated with bearing a de-
formed child. But, although the American public approves the
use of contraceptives as a means for family planning, it opposes
the use of abortion.
95. Rossi, supra note 65, at 8-9. The sample is discussed in greater
detail in Rossi, Public Views on Abortion, in THE CASE FOa LEGAL-
IZTn ABORTIONS MovE 26 (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967).
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Essentially, one's position with regard to legal reform is de-
termined by the focus placed upon the problem. Those who focus
upon the fetus reach a different result than those who focus upon
the needs of the woman who becomes pregnant. The revisers
of the Model Penal Code assumed a sociological approach, but
their findings have been criticized as being based upon in-
complete sociological data.9 6 Though they refer to the Scan-
dinavian experience, they do not manifest a true understand-
ing of the problems confronted in these countries. Signifi-
cantly, Sweden is considering further liberalization since many
Swedish women, unable to obtain an abortion in their home
country, have gone to Poland and the Soviet Union. The Ad-
visory Committee appeared to have "collected an incomplete
set of sociological data, followed a 'hunch,' and reached a deci-
sion which the realists would say they wanted all along."97
The effect of the Code is to legalize those abortions which
are performed in hospitals for humanitarian reasons. This has
been the Colorado experience after liberalization of its statute
along the lines of the Code, though with some modifications.98
Since the law was changed, the number of abortions has in-
creased somewhat.
The Colorado law places the burden upon the physician to de-
termine precisely the medical and legal indications favoring abor-
tion. The Guidelines of the Colorado Medical Society, in clari-
fying the new Abortion Statute, provide two sets of standards
for justifying medical termination of pregnancies. The medi-
cal standard relates to the patient's physical or mental health or
the likely condition of the fetus, while the socio-legal standard
relates to pregnancies resulting from certain crimes of rape and
incestuous marriage.
In the medically justified cases, the initial evaluation is made
by the attending physician, who obtains the pertinent medical
history and makes the examinations and tests considered neces-
sary. If eligibility for abortion is based on impairment of men-
tal health, the statute requires that the attending physician ac-
quire the written confirmation of a psychiatrist and include it
in his documentation of the case. If he concludes that the case
presents one or more of the medical conditions for which the
Statute authorizes a termination of pregnancy, he has the re-
sponsibility of preparing a documented report of his findings and
96. Barnard, supra note 85, at 561.
97. Id.
98. CoLo. REv. STAT. AN. § 40-2-50 (Supp. 1968).
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conclusions to present to a special hospital board. The report
should include the medical history, the examinations and tests
made, and specific findings as to the condition or conditions
which bring the case within the statutory standards. This
documentation is to be made before the patient is admitted to
the hospital to avoid unnecessary expense, greater anxiety and
disappointment, and the possibility of generating pressures on
the special hospital board to rush its deliberation. It is recog-
nized that exceptions may arise in "processing" a case.
In rape and incest cases, participation by the District Attor-
ney of the judicial district in which the alleged rape or incest
occurred is required. Once consulted by a patient who pro-
fesses to have been the victim of such a crime and seeks termina-
tion of the resulting pregnancy, the attending physician, upon
confirming the pregnancy, causes the matter to be brought to
the attention of the appropriate District Attorney. An investi-
gation is made to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe the alleged violation occurred and a report of the find-
ings is made to the special hospital board. The attending
physician also has the responsibility of determining the duration
of the period of gestation. Generally, the preliminary evaluation
of the case, including the District Attorney's findings, will be
completed prior to the actual admission of the patient to the
hospital. Initiation of hospital admission, at the appropriate
stage, is also the responsibility of the attending physician. In
this type of case, the abortion must be performed before sixteen
weeks of gestation have passed. Where the age or marital status
of the patient is an important factor, particularly as to the
statutory standard applicable to the case, verification of such
conditions through certified copies of birth and marriage certifi-
cates may be required. The attending physician procures them
for inclusion in his documentation of the case.
The intentional termination of pregnancy must be requested
by the woman in written form and, depending on her age and
marital status, by other persons. The need for informed consent
is stressed.
Although in rape and incest cases the statute is interpreted
to mean that the crimes must have been committed in Colorado,
the Guidelines state that the law is not limited in terms of the
residence or domicile of the patient. Great restraint in the ac-
ceptance of a patient from outside of Colorado is recommended,
however. The attending physician's need for personal knowledge
of the patient's medical history and present condition justifies the
[Vol. 53: 1
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voluntary limitation of the statute to Colorado residents.
Abortion reform has also been instituted in Britain. Under
a bill recently passed by Parliament, a pregnancy may be ter-
minated if any two physicians find that a continued pregnancy
might threaten the mother's life, injure her physical or mental
health, or cause serious physical or mental abnormalities to
her existing children. 9 The British law permits abortion on
broader grounds than does the Colorado statute. While the
Colorado law requires a unanimous finding by a three-member
panel that the pregnancy would result in the mother's death or
serious or permanent impairment of her physical or mental
health, the British law merely requires that the risk of an
injury to the mother's health would be greater than if the preg-
nancy were terminated. The "social clause"-the consideration
of risk to other children-allows consideration of overcrowding
in a large family, inadequate housing, and strain upon the
mother. The legislation permits that account be taken of the
woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable environment. This
"social clause" was opposed by the medical profession.10 0
V. A PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSIONS
Clearly, the laws relating to abortion need to be reformed.
When 250,000 to over one million abortions are performed an-
nually, of which an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 are legal, and
when in cities such as New York illegal abortion is one of
the prime causes of maternal death, a serious social problem
exists. The incidence rate indicates a need for public and leg-
islative concern.
Medical researchers do not avoid attempts to find a cure for a
rare disease because the chances are it will cripple or kill only
10,000 people a year. We do not consider unemployment a
minor social problem because more than 90 percent of the labor
force is employed. We do not rest content with educational at-
tainment of American youth because the majority now complete
a high school education.
The same reasoning should apply to the abortion problem.
Those who argue with the incidence estimates, or resist change
in our abortion laws on the grounds that it is not an extensive
social problem, are either deluding us or themselves as to what
is really at the heart of their disclaimers: they do not wish to
see any liberalization of abortion laws because they are opposed
to abortion per se; or they have little or no empathy for the
women who want to obtain one; or they consciously or uncon-
sciously believe the psychologically punishing and medically
99. Abortion Act 1967, ch. 87.
100. The New York Times, Oct. 26, 1967, at 1, col. 2.
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and legally risky experience of securing an illegal abortion is
deserved-it is a punishment for becoming pregnant if you
are poor or unmarried or already have a large family.10'
Those who are concerned about protecting the rights of
the unborn child should also advocate reform. The present
state of the law with its nonenforcement clearly does not pro-
tect the rights of the fetus. The obstacles for more stringent en-
forcement are insurmountable. A solution must be found.
Conceivably, the problem might be resolved to some extent
by scientific advancement. Perhaps it may be possible to re-
move the fetus at an early stage of pregnancy and allow it to
develop fully under laboratory conditions. 10 2 Medicine may now
predict with a great degree of certainty whether a fetus under
certain circumstances will develop into a defective child. But
it is conceivable that medical science will be able to treat the
fetus, either inside or outside the womb, so that the abnormali-
ties will be averted. These developments will undoubtedly cre-
ate ethical and legal problems, but may lead to a resolution of
the abortion problem. A woman not wanting to bear a child
could have the fetus removed but kept alive outside the womb.
The child could then be given to her or adopted by someone else.
The pregnant woman would then not be required to undergo a
pregnancy which would be damaging to her physical or mental
health or adversely affect her social or economic position and
yet the rights of the fetus would be protected. The ultimate
solution of the abortion problem lies in scientific and social ad-
vancement. Priority should be given in the allocation of re-
sources to resolve this problem.
While the problem is too pressing to wait for science to
provide the solution, law reform must anticipate possible scien-
tific development. For example, if a law is to permit abortion
at any point before the fetus would be capable of existing and
101. Rossi, supra note 65, at 10.
102. H. KAEra & A. WENE, Tm YEAR 2000 (1967). A team of
surgeons at the Cleveland Clinic Foundation recently developed an
artificial placenta made of a silicone membrane which can add oxygen to
blood and remove carbon dioxide from it to save babies whose lungs
have suffered from hyaline membrane disease or failed to open up after
birth. This apparatus suggests the possibility of saving babies whose
lungs have not developed. This placenta, combined with the system of
grem-free isolators and water-soluble diets offers the eventual possibility
of duplicating conditions in the womb for babies whose lungs and
digestive system could not possibly sustain extra-uterine existence and
are certain to die if accidentally delivered or deliberately aborted from
the womb. Thus, abortion may not mean the death of the fetus.
Pleasants, A Morality of Consequences, 86 CommoNwEAL 413 (1967).
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developing outside the womb, it should be anticipated that in
the future a fetus might be kept alive even before sixteen weeks
of pregnancy. Similarly, the law should not take an irrevoca-
ble position of negating the right to life of the fetus on the
assumption that the needs of the mother are superior, when the
two might be reconciled. Fetal euthanasia should not be com-
mitted unnecessarily. The mere fact that a fetus is defective
should not be grounds for an abortion, since such defects may
be subject to treatment. Moreover, even a defective child can
contribute to social well-being. The thalidomide babies who have
reached school age have been able to make remarkable adjust-
ments. Many of these children have manifested excellent in-
tellectual ability and, despite their handicaps, have been ac-
cepted by classmates.10 3
A mechanism must be provided for protecting the rights of
the woman, her fetus, the interests of society, and conceivably
her husband, or donor of the sperm. The woman has a right to
life, to physical and mental health, and to protection from
what may result if she were compelled to give birth. On the
other hand, she should not be compelled to undergo an abortion.
The fetus has a right to life, but not at the expense of the life
or health of the mother. Society is concerned in protecting the
mother from being compelled to undergo an abortion against
her will, as well as from having her health endangered by the
pregnancy. Society is also concerned, as part of the public order,
in protecting the rights of the fetus. Each fetus is capable of
developing into a unique human being potentially able to
make a unique contribution to society. The husband or donor of
the sperm has an interest in the fetus because he has contributed
to its existence-it is a part of him and the child would be his
offspring. But his interest is subordinate to the health of the
mother. Legal guidelines must be formulated.
The starting point for legal reform lies in the Model Penal
Code provisions. An abortion law should provide that an abor-
tion may be performed where the life or health of the mother
may be endangered or adversely affected. Each case should be
determined by an administrative board comprised of a physician,
obstetrician, psychiatrist, social worker, housewife, lawyer and
representative of the general public. Provision should be made
for judicial review. The law should further provide that the
board would particularly focus upon facts establishing that the
pregnancy results from rape or incest, the mother is under six-
103. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 19, 1967, § 1A, at 1, col. 4.
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teen years of age, or the fetus would result in the birth of an ab-
normal child. Similarly, it should be recognized that a woman's
ultimate realization that she will give birth to a deformed child
may traumatically affect her in such a manner as to endanger
her health. The board would not, however, be precluded from
considering other circumstances under which a woman's health
may be adversely affected. Thus, a woman who has had a num-
ber of children may be permitted to have an abortion if an addi-
tional child would adversely affect her health. The board would
consider the effect of the pregnancy upon her relationship with
her other children as a mother and upon the marital relation-
ship. The concept of health involves considering the individual
as a whole within his social environment. 10 4 The board would
adhere to this concept in considering the effect upon the health
of a woman for whom abortion may be indicated.
The same approach would be taken with an unmarried
woman. The mere fact that she happens to be unmarried should
not preclude an abortion. However, her marital status may be a
factor in considering the effect of the pregnancy upon her
health. If the pregnancy causes severe depression and the birth
of the child may lead to neurosis, an abortion may be indicated.
In addition, a woman's determination to undergo an abortion
should also be considered.
The administrative mechanism should operate to keep the
woman's identity and her problem strictly confidential. The
case of a woman for whom an abortion is indicated would be
referred to the board by her physician, and an independent
physical and psychiatric examination would be undertaken. A
woman could also approach the board on her own initiative.
This would allow a troubled, pregnant woman to seek help.
She would receive consultation services from a social worker.
In all cases a preliminary determination would be made to deter-
mine if, in fact, the woman seeking the abortion is acting upon
her own free will, without coercion. Writers on the abortion
problem have ignored the possibility that a woman undergoing
an abortion may be acting because of psychological or physical
pressure or threats by the father. In all such instances, a
104. Report of the Royal Medico-Psychological Association, British
Policy on Therapeutic Abortion, 199 JouRN. OF A.m. MED. Ass'w 199
(1967):
When considering the possibly deleterious effects of pregnancy,
and the desirability of terminating it, psychiatrists have to
bear in mind not only the direct, but also the remote effects on
the health and well-being of the mother. ...
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woman should be given protection, so that she may safely have
her child.
On the other hand, in making a determination, the board
should also consider the attitude of the father. Though his
opposition to the abortion should not be the dispositive factor, it
should be considered within the context of the particular case.
The woman may elect to appear before the board person-
ally to argue her case or have a representative act upon her
behalf. In most cases, decisions would be made upon the sub-
mission of written reports. Provision would also be made for
the presence of an advocate who would be paid by the state to
assert the rights of the fetus in presenting arguments to estab-
lish that the pregnancy would not adversely affect the woman's
health and that provision would be made for the adoption or
other care of the child when born. In the case of an unwanted
child, provision may be made for adoption or other care even
before its birth. Facilities for unwed mothers and unwanted
children might be established.
The alternative to therapeutic abortion need not be the
criminal abortionist. Though any restriction upon the legal
performance of abortions will inevitably give rise to a significant
number of criminal abortions, the problem can be limited by
providing sound assistance to the woman who is denied a thera-
peutic abortion so that she will become reconciled to her preg-
nancy. When an abortion is denied, the administrative process
should provide social services for assisting the woman in going
through with the pregnancy and in bearing the child. If the
case arose because the woman felt she was incapable of caring
for the child she should be given psychotherapy so that she will
become reconciled to having the baby, and arrangement should
be made either for its adoption or for assisting the woman with
a monetary subsidy or necessary social services. Indeed, upon
giving birth, she may find such a joy in motherhood that she
will want the child after all. On the other hand where thera-
peutic abortion is indicated, the state should provide financial
assistance for the operation where the woman lacks the financial
means. Society must recognize that the woman seeking an abor-
tion is in need of help and should provide her with guidance
and assistance.
In no circumstances should a woman who is receiving pub-
lic assistance be compelled to undergo an abortion against her
will. Provision should be made to protect such women, who
may, because of their relationship and dependence upon case
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workers, feel they are being coerced. In addition, no doctor
should be compelled to perform an abortion if such an act is
contrary to his moral scruples. Similarly, a nurse, medical aid
or anesthetist should not be compelled to assist in an abortion.
Clearly, abortion as a social problem involves a myriad of
conflicting economic and moral issues. Yet, the present state of
the law does not cope with these issues. Statutes such as the
Model Penal Code merely resolve one aspect of the problem-
that affecting the woman who is in need of a narrowly de-
fined therapeutic abortion. Real legal reform must attack the
problem by permitting abortion where the mother's health is
adversely affected and by broadening the concept of "health" to
encompass the complete physical and mental health of the
woman as affected by her total environment. Facilities must be
provided to help the troubled, pregnant woman. However, ade-
quate emphasis must also be placed upon the rights of the fetus,
the concern of the husband or donor of the sperm, the family
relationship and the general social order. Only after considera-
tion of all these factors can reasonable and just laws be adopted
and applied.
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